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Democracy is a delicate flower.
Mário Soares1
 
Reluctant yet pragmatic: Introduction
1 There was a new development in Portuguese foreign policy from the mid-1970s, with a
more interested, active and committed participation in European integration. The end
of the Estado Novo (New State) authoritative regime, and the beginning of the transition
towards democracy, introduced significant changes in the Portuguese foreign policy
priorities,  specifically  in  regard  to  Europe  and  European integration,  even  if  those
changes were not immediate or disruptive. 
2 Between April 1974 and July 1976 the first, timid, inconsistent and somewhat casual
pro-democratic steps were taken towards choosing Europe as a political and economic
reference for the new political regime. By then, Portugal was no longer an apprentice
in regard to European integration, but it had never followed the “main route”,2 that is,
it  had  never  been  fully  engaged  in  it.  In  fact,  from  a  broader  perspective,  the
participation  in  the  Marshall  Plan  was  the  start  of  the  Portuguese  “European
adventure”.3 Due to the non-democratic nature of the political regime, Portugal was
not invited to negotiate the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, nor
the creation of  the European Economic Community  (EEC),  but  the  country  kept  on
building contacts, mostly economic ones, conducted over the course of more than two
decades,  in  which,  despite  the  government’s  little  political  interest  in  European
integration,  it  was  able  to  collect  economic  benefits  and advantages  from it.  Thus,
despite two requests to enhance the existing relationship between the country and the
EEC in the 1960s and the signing of trade agreements in 1972, it was only after 1974,
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with the slow emergence of a new political regime in Portugal, that the relationship
between Portugal and the EEC was going to improve and undergo a positive change,
especially by the decision to join the EEC.
3 Amongst the reasons that supported the accession request one stands out: democratic
consolidation.  Indeed,  several  authors  point  out  the  establishment  and/or
consolidation of democracy as a reason for presenting the EEC membership request.4
Hence,  by  addressing  the  Portugal-EEC  relationship  between  1974  and  1977,  this
archive-research article aims to acknowledge the democratic principle as a condition
for  any  state  to  join  the  EEC  and,  particularly,  to  assess what  its  role  was  in  the
Portuguese goal of joining the EEC in 1977 and of obtaining financial aid from it.5 
 
Democracy and accession to the EEC
4 Application for membership has its legal basis in article 237 of the Treaty of Rome,
which  states  that  “any  European  state  may  apply  to  become  a  member  of  the
Community”,  by  addressing  “its  application  to  the  Council,  which  shall  act
unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission”. Although the Treaty of
Rome  is  rather  vague  as  to  the  membership  requirements,  stating  only  that  the
candidate  must  belong  geographically  to  Europe,  the  predecessor  of  the  European
Parliament,  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  EEC,  had  set  some  conditions  for
membership in 1962: geographically belonging to Europe, having a minimum degree of
industrialization;  being a  democratic  regime;  belonging  to  Western  defence
organizations,  and accepting the Treaty of Rome.6 In the same year,  the Birkelbach
Report7 established similar conditions: only European states could join the EEC; they
must  have  the  capacity  to  pursue  EEC’s  economic  goals;  and  they  had  to  be  a
democracy. Later, in 1970, the Davignon Report8 supported a vision of Europe built on
the respect of freedom and human rights, which unites democratic states that have
elected parliaments. Until 1976, except for the geographical circumstance of belonging
to Europe, Portugal did not fulfil any of these conditions. 
5 When the United Kingdom (UK) started to engage its way out of the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA) to join the EEC in 1961, Portugal, a founding member of the EFTA,
had a choice to make regarding a possible application to the EEC.  With an UK-free
EFTA, Portugal would lose its main trading partner and some other business benefits.
Resigned,  but  not  convinced,  Portugal  tried  to  get  a  closer  and  more  beneficial
involvement with the EEC on two occasions, in 1962 and again in 1969, following UK
accession requests, even though it did not clearly state whether it was pursuing a fiscal,
commercial or association agreement. Neither attempt resulted in more than a trade
agreement,  because,  although the EEC was mainly an economic organization at  the
time, its genesis included the principle of political democracy, which kept Portugal, an
authoritarian regime, away from any other pretension.
6 In  regard  to  European  integration,  the  1953  diplomatic  circular  on  the  idea  of  a
European federation,9 written by Salazar himself, clearly states that Portugal’s vocation
has  always  been the  sea  and that  the  overseas  expansion was  the  most  distinctive
accomplishment of Portuguese history: the Atlantic is definitely the country’s calling,
which, in itself, imposes limits to European cooperation. Nevertheless, the 1960s may
be considered as the starting point for a new phase in relation to Europe, characterized
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by  less  isolation  and  greater  openness  to  the  movement  for  economic  European
cooperation. 
7 By joining EFTA since its beginning in 1960, Portugal ceased to be an outcast from the
European  integration  movements,  although  once  again  Salazar  yielded  without
yielding, since Portuguese commitments were purely economic and commercial, and
most importantly did not concern or jeopardize the colonial territories, nor the regime.
10 In the end, the EFTA experience facilitated the Portuguese entry in the first line of
European integration, and it was indeed the first real step towards its integration into
the European economic area,  which proved to  be fundamental  for  the signature of
trade agreements in 1972. In reality, both movements –decolonization and European
integration– had been agglutinated by the Portuguese political elites into a single issue:
the regime’s survival.11 
8 After Salazar’s rule, Marcelo Caetano’s, who came into office in 1968, ideas about the
relationship between Portugal and Europe did “not depart out of the pragmatism that
was defined by his predecessor”,12 while he maintained two important lines of action:
the first concerned the survival of the regime, which was closely linked to retaining the
overseas provinces and to the preference for Atlantic relations; the second looked at
trade, given the fact that Europe was the country’s main trading partner from the 1960s
onwards. 
9 Despite a strong commitment in colonial issues, there was also a new and fledgling pro-
European movement that, regardless of numerous obstacles, was able to achieve some
positive  results  and  bring  the  country  closer  to  European  institutions.13 This  was
especially  true  of  the  1972  Trade  Agreements,  which  were  the  last  formal  act  of
approaching Europe before the end of the regime. After the Carnation Revolution on
25 April 1974 and the subsequent decolonization, a broad discussion about what the
main option of the country’s foreign policy should be was on the agenda.
10 In the two attempts to get closer to the EEC in the 1960s, “Portugal had problems in
almost  all  areas”,14 but  since the Portuguese political  situation would change a few
years  later,  the  scenario  was  going  to  be  more  favourable  for  Portugal.  After  the
Carnation  Revolution,  Portugal  began  a  democratic  adjustment  of  its  political
institutions, which would last for two years, until the first elected government came
into  office  on  23 July  1976.  In  the  first  years  after  the  revolution  there  was  some
uncertainty  about  the  options  for  the  direction  to  take,  both  domestically  and  in
foreign  policy,  until  three  different  priorities  finally  emerged:  completing
decolonization  by  25 November  1975;  defining  the  type  of  regime  for  the  country,
seeking support abroad and approaching the EEC with the purpose of raising financing
and furthering trade relations; and moving towards Europe, from the end of 1975 when
Europe/EEC  began  to  strengthen  its  position  in  the  context  of  the  definition  of
Portuguese foreign policy.15
11 However, as both José Medeiros Ferreira and António José Telo point out,16 at the time
there was a struggle regarding foreign policy preferences, with no clear guidelines, and
a multiplication of institutional actors (the Church, political parties, trade unions, etc.)
which had their own particular understandings and agenda, and while some supported
the reinforcement of Atlantic relations, others advocated total isolation or closer ties
with the bloc of “Third World” countries. Despite this profusion of opinions, even if the
EEC was not the only choice and the one that gathered the most supporters, the so-
called  Western/democratic  option  appeared  as  “virtually  unquestionable”,  and  its
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supporters argued that democratic consolidation was a requirement for EEC accession.
17 
12 Among the  reasons  given in  support  of  Portuguese  application,  the  most  cited  are
precisely democratic consolidation and economic development.18 In Portugal, as well as
in Spain and previously in Greece, such underlying justifications for their respective
application  were  somewhat  “cautious  and  vague”,  foreseeing  that  accession  would
strengthen democracy and enhance economic development, not considering the full
economic and social implications of it.19 
13 For  applicant  countries,  the  motivations  to  join,  with  some  few  exceptions,  were
economic and political. The Portuguese case is no exception and has been touted as an
example  and  compared  to  the  Eastern  enlargement  in  its  features  of  democratic
consolidation  support  and  economic  development.  For  instance,  Pedro  Álvares
compares the Portuguese accession negotiations with the 2004 enlargement in several
areas, such as competition, fisheries, external relations, taxation, social policy and the
internal  market,  and  establishes  similarities  between  both  negotiations.20 Sebástian
Royo presents some lessons, such as the argument that the democratic principle is an
incentive for democratization and institutional reform,21 and more recently, Martijn
Schukkink  and  Arne  Niemann  argue  that  the  Portuguese  support  for  the  fifth
enlargement had always been based on the concepts of democratic choice and stability,
presented ever since the Portuguese accession negotiations.22
 
Democracy and financial aid
14 The fragile political situation in Portugal and the needs expressed by the Portuguese
authorities led many European leaders –Max Van der Stöel, Claude Cheysson, Altiero
Spinelli, Edmund Wellenstein, Roland de Kergorlay, Xavier Ortoli, Christopher Soames–
23 to visit Portugal between 1974 and 1976 and some Portuguese government officials –
Rui Vilar, Ernesto Melo Antunes and José da Silva Lopes– to visit Brussels in order to
learn what the position of the EEC was in relation to Portugal and its claims. 
15 Two months  only  after  taking office  on 16 May 1974,  the  first  interim government
expressed at the third meeting of the Joint Committee EEC-Portugal, held in Brussels on
27 June, its intention to apply the evolutionary clause of the 1972 trade agreements,
thus demonstrating interest in “consolidating and intensifying the existing relations”24
with the EEC. In addition, the government also conveyed the hope that the EEC could
quickly  help  the  Portuguese  economy,  stressing  the  link  the  country  had with  the
democratic principle and the fundamental objectives of the EEC.25 
16 On  a  visit  to  Bonn  (19-20 May  1975),  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Ernesto  Melo
Antunes  noted that,  at  the  time,  the  exclusion to  accession was due specifically  to
Portugal’s poor economic development.26 Underlying this statement, however, was a
governance shift  leftwards.  In  fact,  “the radicalization of  the revolutionary process
would  hinder  closer  relations  with  Europe”,  not  only  due  to  the  EEC’s  rigidity  in
supporting only a democratic regime, but also because provisional governments “are
not committed in this reinforcement, for which they have rejected any possibility of
association  with  the  Community  and  explicitly  assumed the  privileged  relationship
with the Third World countries”.27
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17 During  the  spring  of  1975,  the  Portuguese  political  situation  became  increasingly
unstable  The  EEC  remained  attentive  to  the  unfolding  events  and  fretted  with  the
succession  of  provisional  governments,  and  especially  with  the  possibility  that  the
country would head towards communism, so it  responded cautiously to Portuguese
needs, since no member state considered the presence of communists in the interim
governments as a positive factor. There was however the understanding within the EEC
that the country should not be left alone. In June 1975, the Commission suggested an
economic and financial aid so as to contribute to the country’s economic development
and  to  show  the  Portuguese  that  it  was  willing  to  help  the  nation  move  towards
democracy.28
18 The  second  interim  government  led  by  Vasco  Gonçalves  brought  more  military  to
ministerial posts and started a left-leaning political turn. Soon afterwards, the third
interim government, which took office on 30 September 1975, formally assumed in its
programme the will to submit proposals to modify some clauses of the EEC-Portugal
trade agreements,  namely regarding the textile  and steel  industries,  and to  extend
cooperation to other areas. This was, however, a fleeting endeavour, as a government
reshuffle led, four months later, to another provisional government, which adopted a
“gently apart and reticent”29 position regarding Europe. 
19 In  regard  to  the  Portuguese  transition  to  democracy,  particular  assessments  on
different actors were made, such as on Mário Soares’s role and the way his actions
contributed and/or influenced the country’s path towards choosing a political regime
in  1975-1976;  on  the  German  policy  towards  Portugal  for  the  establishment  of  a
pluralist  and Western-like  democracy;  on the United States’  political  action and its
impact in Portugal during the democratic transition; and also on US reaction to the
Portuguese revolution and its impact on the relations between the United States and its
Western European allies; finally, on NATO members’ attitudes towards the evolution of
the revolutionary process in Portugal.30
20 Francisco Castro examines the influence that both the EEC and the United States of
America had in the Portuguese transition period, revealing two distinct positions: the
USA would not tolerate the presence of communists in the government, but it would
not  intervene,  so  for  the Americans,  Portugal  should serve as  an example to  other
countries. As far as the EEC was concerned, moderates should be helped, in view of a
political  evolution  towards  parliamentary  democracy.31 But  even  these  distinctive
positions were not inflexible.  Whilst  Secretary of  State Henry Kissinger wanted the
communists to take power to turn Portugal into a model of a communist regime, the
Ambassador  to  Portugal,  Frank  Carlucci,  on  the  other  hand  wanted  to  help  the
moderates, a solution that would prevail in the end. Similar contrasts applied within
the EEC, where Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was against any aid to Portugal because of the
risk of it becoming communist, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany financially
supported the moderates. 
21 In the midst of these two diverging opinions among the member states, at the Brussels
European Council (16-17 July 1975), there was an understanding that the EEC aid should
be conditioned on the progress made towards pluralist democracy. In the conclusions
of this Council, a statement on Portugal clearly indicated that the EEC was willing to
cooperate more with the country in economic and financial areas, as long as Portugal
became a democratic state.32 
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22 The same understanding was reaffirmed later in 1975 in the Luxembourg European
Council,  where  member  states  agreed  that  EEC’s  support  truly  depended  on  the
developments of the Portuguese political state of affairs and its commitment towards
democracy, which leads us to the relationship between democracy and financial aid.33
On  this  matter,  the  Commission  position  was  very  clear,  when  it  stated  that  “the
emergency aid should clearly be framed on the perspective of the consolidation of a
pluralistic  democracy in Portugal,  being of  the Community best  interest  to support
Portugal to that end”, adding that if “Portugal does not pursue that goal or it becomes
out of reach, all the arguments in favour of that help will lose their legitimacy”.34
23 On the  relationship  between democracy  and European integration,  Robert  Fishman
believes that the EEC did not create Southern Europe democracies, on the occasion of
their  applications  to  become member  states,35 but  in  fact  the  relationship  between
democratization  and  European  integration  “evolved  to  the  consolidation  path”.36
Precisely, one of the most distinctive lessons learned from the Portuguese case is the
important  role  that  organizations  such as  the  EEC could  play  in  transition  periods
towards democracy. Portugal was indeed one of the first countries where the EEC used
the prospect of economic aid and eventual membership as an incentive for further
democratization.37
24 In that sense, it was only at the end of 1975 (7 October), when the government was
already free of a communist trend and more stable, and the EEC believed that Portugal
would follow the route of a pluralist democracy, that an exceptional emergency aid was
given to Portugal. Later that year (25 November), a military coup put a definitive halt to
any further left-wing progression. 
25 At  that  early  stage  of  democracy-building  in  Portugal,  the  EEC  was  apprehensive,
fearful that a real democracy might not be accomplished. With that in mind, it was
often said by Commission officials that the EEC was willing to help Portugal by any
means, but that it would only do so if Portugal presented proofs that it was actually
heading  for  a  democratic  regime.  During  the  Strasbourg  session  of  the  European
Parliament (16 to 20 June 1975), the European Commissioner for External Relations,
Christopher Soames, called on the EEC to grant an immediate and substantial assistance
to Portugal,  a  financial  aid which would help Portugal  progress towards a pluralist
democracy. This proposal was, in fact, presented at a time of growing scepticism among
European  leaders  in  regard  to  the  latest  developments  in  Portugal,  who  were  not
confident about the effect that such aid could have.38
26 A sign that things were getting on track, proven by the beginning of the stabilization of
the Portuguese democracy, was given on 20 January 1976, when the Council authorized
the revision of the 1972 trade agreements. Negotiations were achieved six months later.
Although this revision was important, especially for Portugal, it did not fundamentally
change  the  relationship  between Portugal  and  the  EEC,  since  it  remained a  purely
commercial  involvement.  Nevertheless,  after  Portugal  had  been  considered  as  the
“Albania of Western Europe”,39 1976 was an important year in the improvement of that
liaison,  setting in motion a course of  action that would lead to presentation of  the
accession request in 1977.
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Membership as a reward for democratization
27 When the first  constitutional  government,  led by Mário Soares,  came into office in
1976, the history of the relationship between Portugal and the EEC changed. Until then
the EEC had a somewhat secondary place in Portuguese foreign policy, but from that
moment on it became a priority, which could only be fulfilled with accession. 
28 In order to achieve that goal, Prime Minister Soares decided to go on a European tour 
and visited  the  member  states’  capitals  between 14 February  and 12 March 1977  in
order to gain support. From the beginning of these visits, the main argument was set:
democracy  in  Europe,40 an  argument  that  British  and  Germans  suggested  from the
beginning. In this respect, Suzannah Verney argues that democratic tradition was not
present at the time of the creation of the EEC, but it developed during the next half
century,  expanding  in  response  to  external  and  not  to  internal  stimuli.41 In  fact,
initially,  none  of  the  founding  treaties  established  democracy  as  an  objective  of
European integration, although from the 1960s it began to appear in the Community’s
discourse, until it found an explicit reference in the Single European Act (1986). But
already with the first enlargement in 1973, “the international support for democracy
became a publicly proclaimed goal of the Community”.42
29 The outcome of the European tour was positive in regard to the political support that all
member  states  endorsed  for  the  country’s  democratic  consolidation,  which  used  a
weakness –the fear of becoming a communist state– as its strongest argument.43 Indeed,
the importance of economic factors should not overshadow the political motivations of
joining  the  EEC,  since  “accession  was  primarily  a  political  choice:  EEC  integration
created a complex system of incentives (symbolic and material) and guarantees that
favoured democratization” both in Portugal and in Spain.44 On 28 March 1977 Portugal
presented  its  application  to  join  the  EEC  and  the  arguments  presented  to  request
accession were essentially two: democratic stabilization and economic development. 
30 The first constitutional government played an important role in regard to Portugal’s
European integration,  by  providing a  new impetus  and by  delivering the  accession
request, signifying that Europe was no longer just an economic option, but rather a
political  one.  On  28 March  1977,  the  Portuguese  Ambassador,  António  de  Siqueira
Freire,  presented  the  EEC  accession  application,  which  entailed  a  long  and  thorny
accession  negotiation  process,  during  which  the  argument  supporting  the
consolidation  of  Portuguese  democracy  was  repeated  several  times  throughout  the
negotiations and by different actors, who considered membership as “a guarantee for
the  consolidation  of  the  young  democracy”45 and  a  “means  of  underwriting
democracy”.46
31 In Portugal, Greece and Spain the progress towards democracy was undeniable47 and
that pleased the EEC, whose representatives assumed their commitment towards it. On
the other hand, it was evident that rejecting an application from those three countries
would “stimulate the Communist forces evidently alive in each of them”,48 a fact that
determined that the reasons underlying both the second and third enlargements were
political, both for the applicant countries as well as for the member states.49
32 The accession request entailed a complex negotiation process,  in which what might
have appeared, at the start, to be a simple and fast negotiation, similar to the previous
ones, ended after almost eight years of negotiations. All sort of things interacted with
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and  delayed  Portuguese  accession.  Along  the  way,  as  Tsoukalis  points  out,  the
Portuguese negotiating strength was sustained by both its economic weakness and the
threat  of  a  radical  reorientation  of  its  foreign  policy.50 Future  EEC  membership
considered accession as “a reward for democratization”,51 which makes democracy a
key point in the history of the relationship between Portugal and the EEC. 
 
Conclusion
33 For two decades, between 1951 and 1972, Portugal decided, partly on its own, partly
due to external constraints –mostly to its non-democratic political regime– to continue
relations with the EEC without seeking closer involvement, also given the fact that in
the 1960s and 1970s joining the EEC was neither a real possibility nor a genuine desire.
34 With the overthrow of the authoritarian regime, Portugal initiated its path towards
democracy. However, it took some time before the achievement of a minimum degree
of democratic consolidation. Concerned about the political developments in Portugal,
the EEC subordinated from the beginnings its economic assistance and support to the
instauration of a democratic regime. Only a democratic Portugal could, first, receive
economic and financial assistance, and then become a member state. 
35 In two years, between 25 April 1974 and 1976, when the first constitutional government
took office, six interim governments held office, lasting between one and ten months.
Under those circumstances, any further and more concrete definition or precise and
structuring collaboration with the EEC would be characterized by a lack of political
credibility  and  legitimacy.  Hence,  and  eventually  up  to  1978,  when  negotiations
officially  began,  there  were few but  significant  improvements:  the  recognition that
Portugal  was  establishing  a  democratic  regime,  albeit  still  fragile;  the  membership
acceptance  principle;  and  the  formal  opening  of  negotiations.  At  a  time  when  the
country was dealing with many internal problems and decolonization, there was a firm
commitment with a foreign entity, as a source of support and assistance for democracy
and for economic development. In fact, the EEC was seen as a new national project for
the country, which had just lost a long-lasting empire. It would certainly not substitute
it in the memories and affections of the Portuguese, but it  was a real and concrete
project in which the country could be involved in. 
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ABSTRACTS
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Portugal’s first two attempts to become more involved with the
European Economic Community (EEC) and gain membership met with failure, mainly for one
reason: the undemocratic nature of the Portuguese regime. In 1977, only three years after the
overturn of  the Estado Novo,  Portugal  applied to become a full  member of  the EEC with new
political credentials. This article contributes to the understanding of the link between democracy
and accession to the EEC, assessing the role that democratic principles, acknowledged in several
political  reports  and  enshrined  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  played  at  a  very  early  stage  in  the
Portuguese negotiations. 
Dans  les  années  1960  et  1970,  les  deux  premières  tentatives  du  Portugal  de  s’impliquer  de
manière plus étroite avec la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) dans le cadre d’une
politique visant à  terme à l’adhésion ont échoué pour une raison principale :  la  nature non-
démocratique du régime portugais.  En 1977, trois ans seulement après l’avènement du Estado
Novo,  le Portugal présente sa demande pour une adhésion pleine et entière à la CEE, dans un
nouveau contexte politique. L’article se propose d’éclaircir le lien entre démocratie et accession à
la  CEE,  en  évaluant  le  rôle  que  le  principe  démocratique,  reconnu  dans  plusieurs  rapports
politiques et inscrit dans le Traité de Rome, a joué dans les premières phases des négociations
portugaises pour l’adhésion à la CEE. 
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